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Abstract—Energy harvesting in cellular networks is an emerg-
ing technique to enhance the sustainability of power-constrained
wireless devices. This paper considers the co-channel deploy-
ment of a macrocell overlaid with small cells. The small cell
base stations (SBSs) harvest energy from environmental sources
whereas the macrocell base station (MBS) uses conventional
power supply. Given a stochastic energy arrival process for
the SBSs, we derive a power control policy for the downlink
transmission of both MBS and SBSs such that they can achieve
their objectives (e.g., maintain the signal-to-interference-plus-
noise ratio (SINR) at an acceptable level) on a given transmission
channel. We consider a centralized energy harvesting mecha-
nism for SBSs, i.e., there is a central energy storage (CES) where
energy is harvested and then distributed to the SBSs. When the
number of SBSs is small, the game between the CES and the
MBS is modeled as a single-controller stochastic game and the
equilibrium policies are obtained as a solution of a quadratic
programming problem. However, when the number of SBSs
tends to infinity (i.e., a highly dense network), the centralized
scheme becomes infeasible, and therefore, we use a mean field
stochastic game to obtain a distributed power control policy for
each SBS. By solving a system of partial differential equations,
we derive the power control policy of SBSs given the knowledge
of mean field distribution and the available harvested energy
levels in the batteries of the SBSs.
Index Terms—Small cell networks, power control, energy
harvesting, stochastic game, mean field game.
I. INTRODUCTION
Energy harvesting from environment resources (e.g.,
through solar panels, wind power, or geo-thermal power) is a
potential technique to reduce the energy cost of operating the
base stations (BSs) in emerging multi-tier cellular networks.
While this solution may not be practically feasible for macro-
cell base stations (MBSs) due to their high power consump-
tion and stochastic nature of energy harvesting sources, it is
appealing for small cell BSs (SBSs) that typically consume
less power [2]. Providing grid power to all SBSs may not
always be feasible due to their possible outdoor/remote/hard-
to-reach locations. Wireless energy harvesting thus enables
dense deployment of SBSs irrespective of the availability
of grid power connections. In general, wireless energy har-
vesting can be classified into the following two categories:
ambient energy harvesting and dedicated energy harvesting.
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In the former case, energy harvested from renewable energy
sources (such as thermal, solar, wind) as well as the energy
harvested from the radio signals in the environment can be
sensed by energy-harvesting receivers. In the latter case,
energy from dedicated sources is transmitted to energy-
harvesting devices to charge them wirelessly.
Designing efficient power control policies with different
objectives (e.g., maximizing system throughput) is among
one of the major challenges in energy-harvesting networks.
In [3], the authors proposed an offline power control policy
for two-hop transmission systems assuming energy arrival
information at the nodes. The optimal transmission policy
was given by the directional water filling method. In [4], the
authors generalized this idea to the case where many sources
supply energy to the destinations using a single relay. A water
filling algorithm was proposed to minimize the probability of
outage. Although the offline power control policies provide
an upper bound and heuristic for online algorithms, the
knowledge of energy/data arrivals is required which may not
be feasible in practice. In [5], the authors proposed a two-state
Markov Decision Process (MDP) model for a single energy-
harvesting device considering random rate of energy arrival
and different priority levels for the data packets. The authors
proposed a low-cost balance policy to maximize the system
throughput by adapting the energy harvesting state, such
that, on average, the harvested and consumed energy remain
balanced. Recently, in [6], the outage performance analysis
was conducted for a multi-tier cellular network in which all
BSs are powered by the harvested energy. A detailed survey
on energy harvesting systems can be found in [7] where the
authors summarized the current research trends and potential
challenges.
Compared to the existing literature on energy-harvesting
systems, this paper considers the power control problem
for downlink transmission in two-tier macrocell-small cell
networks considering stochastic nature of the energy arrival
process at the SBSs. In particular, we assume that ambient
energy harvesting is exploited at a central energy storage
(CES) from where energy can be transferred to the SBSs,
for example, by using dedicated power beacons (PBs). PBs
are low-cost devices that can potentially charge wireless
terminals by transferring energy in a directional manner. Note
that the power control policies at the MBS and the SBSs and
their resulting interference levels directly affect the overall
system performance. The design of efficient power control
policies is thus of paramount importance.
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In the above context, we formulate a discounted stochastic
game model in which all SBSs form a coalition to compete
with the MBS in order to achieve the target signal-to-
interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) of their users through
transmit power control. That is, the MBS and the CES
(which actually represents the set of SBSs in the game)
compete to achieve the desired SINR targets of macrocell
users and small cell users, respectively. Note that both the
MBS and the SBSs transmit in the same channel (i.e., a co-
channel deployment scenario is considered). Therefore, the
competition (or conflict) arises due to the resulting cross-
tier interference, i.e., as the MBS uses more power/energy
to increase the utility of macrocell users, it results in higher
cross-tier interference to small cell users. Similarly, the more
energy/power the CES assigns to SBSs, the higher would
be the cross-tier interference to macrocell users. Note that
the energy harvesting component is an important factor that
indirectly contributes to the conflict. If the energy arrival rate
is large, the SBSs will have a larger energy pool to spend and
thus cause more interference. Clearly, we need to take into the
account the probability of energy arrival when determining
the optimal transmit power policy for each SBS. The amount
of available energy at the transmitter will vary according the
amount of power transmitted and the energy arrival during
each transmission interval. Naturally, the competition above
can be modeled and analyzed by game theoretic tools. How-
ever, unlike in traditional power control games, the actions
and the payoffs of the transmitters at successive transmission
intervals are correlated. This correlation is taken into account
in the proposed stochastic game model. For this game model,
the Nash equilibrium power control policy is obtained as
the solution of a quadratic programming problem. For the
case when the number of SBSs is very large (i.e., an ultra-
dense small cell network (SCN) [8]), the stochastic game
is approximated by a mean field game (MFG). In general,
MFGs are designed to study the strategic decision making
in very large populations of interacting individuals. Recently,
in [9], the authors proposed an MFG model to determine
the optimal power control policy for a finite battery powered
SCN with no energy replacements. However, the stochastic
nature of energy arrival for small cells was not considered.
In this paper, we will consider the case where the battery
can be recharged using random energy arrivals. By solving
a set of forward and backward partial differential equations,
we derive a distributed power control policy for each SBS
using a stochastic MFG model.
The contributions of the paper can be summarized as
follows.
1) For a two-tier macrocell-small cell network, we con-
sider a centralized energy harvesting mechanism for the
SBSs in which energy is harvested and then distributed
to the SBSs through a CES. Unlike in [5], the CES
can have any finite number of energy levels in its
storage, not only 0 and 1. Note that the concept of
CES is somewhat similar to the concept of dedicated
power beacons for wireless energy transfer to users in
cellular networks [10], [11]. Moreover, in a cloud-RAN
architecture [12], where along with data processing
resources, a centralized cloud can also act as an energy
farm that distributes energy to the remote radio heads
each of which acts as an SBS. Note that the SBSs are
not restricted to indoor deployments. Subsequently, we
formulate the power control problem for the MBS and
SBSs as a discrete single-controller stochastic game
with two players. Also, in this paper, we use the signal-
to-interference-plus-noise-ratio (SINR) model instead
of an SNR model which has been commonly used in
other research works on energy harvesting communi-
cation. Consideration of random energy arrivals along
with both co-tier and cross-tier interferences in the
downlink power control problem is the major novelty
of the paper.
2) The existence of the Nash equilibrium and pure sta-
tionary strategies for this single-controller stochastic
game is proven. The power control policy is derived
as the solution of a quadratic-constrained quadratic
programming problem.
3) When the network becomes very dense, a stochastic
MFG model is used to obtain the power control policy
as a solution of the forward and backward differential
equations. In this case, each SBS can harvest, store
energy and transmit data by itself.
4) An algorithm using finite difference method is proposed
to solve these forward-backward differential equations
for the MFG model.
Numerical results demonstrate that the proposed power con-
trol policies offer reduced outage probability for the users
served by the SBSs when compared to the power control
policies using a simple Stackelberg game wherein each SBS
tries to obtain the target SINR of its users without considering
the distribution of energy arrivals.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
describes the system model and assumptions. The formulation
of the single-controller stochastic game model for multiple
SBSs is presented in Section III. In Section IV, we derive the
distributed power control policy using a MFG model when
the number of SBSs increases asymptotically. Performance
evaluation results are presented in Section V before the paper
is concluded in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
A. Energy Harvesting Model
We consider a single macrocell overlaid with M small
cells. The downlink co-channel time-slotted transmission of
the MBS and SBSs is considered and it is assumed that
each BS serves only a single user on a given transmission
channel during a transmission interval (e.g., time slot). The
MBS uses a conventional power source and its transmit power
level is quantized [13] into a discrete set of power levels
P = {pmin0 , ..., pmax0 }, where the subscript 0 denotes the
MBS. On the other hand, the SBSs receive energy from a
centralized energy storage (CES), which harvests renewable
energies from the environment. We assume that only the CES
can store energy for future use and each SBS must consume
all the energy it receives from the CES at every time slot.
The energy arrives at the CES in the form of packets (one
energy packet corresponds to one energy level in CES). The
quantization of energy arrival was assumed in other research
studies such as in [14]. The number of energy packet arrivals
ϕ(t) during any time interval t is discrete and follows an
arbitrary distribution, i.e., Pr(ϕ(t) = X). We assume that
the battery at the CES has a finite storage S. Therefore,
the number of energy packet arrivals is constrained by this
limit and all the exceeding energy packets will be lost, i.e.,
Pr(ϕ(t) = S) = Pr(ϕ(t) ≥ S). The statistics of energy
arrival is known a priori at both the MBS and the CES. At
time t, given the battery level E(t), the number of energy
packet arrivals ϕ(t), and the energy packets Q(t) that the
CES distributes to the M SBSs, the battery level E(t+ 1) at
the next time slot can be calculated as follows:
E(t+ 1) = E(t)−Q(t) + ϕ(t). (1)
Given Q(t) energy packets to distribute, the CES will
choose the best allocation method for the M SBSs accord-
ing to their desired objectives. Denoting the slot duration
as ∆T and the volume of one energy packet as K, we
have the energies distributed to the M SBSs at time t
as (p1(t)∆T, p2(t)∆T, · · · , pM (t)∆T ) where pi(t) is the
transmit power of SBS i at time t. Clearly we must have:
M∑
i=1
pi(t) =
K
∆T
Q(t). (2)
From the causality constraint, E(t) ≥ Q(t) ≥ 0, i.e., the
CES cannot send more energy than that it currently possesses.
Note that E(t) is the current battery level which is an integer
and has its maximum size limited by S. Since the battery
level of the CES and the number of packet arrivals are integer
values, it follows from (1) that Q(t) is also an integer.
Similar to [6] and [25], in our system model, the conflict
between the CES and the MBS arises due to the inter-
ferences between the MBS and the SBSs. Clearly, if the
MBS transmits with large power to achieve the SINR targets
for macrocell users, it will cause high interference to the
small cell users. This means, the SBSs will need to transmit
with larger power to combat this cross-tier interference. The
CES and the MBS have different objective functions and
are free to choose any actions that maximize their own
objectives (i.e., non-cooperative game). Since the SBSs can
only use renewable energy, it is crucial for them to use their
harvested energy economically. Also, unlike a traditional one-
shot transmit power control game, the CES needs to take into
the account the future payoff given the current battery size
and the probability of energy arrivals. In summary, for our
CES model, at each time slot, we will have a random battery
size at the CES and our objective is to maintain the long-term
average SINR close to the target value as much as possible
and thus improve the outage probability.
Without a centralized CES-based architecture, each SBS
can have different amount of harvested energy and in turn
battery levels at each time slot, which will make this problem
a multi-agent stochastic game [15]. Although this kind of
game can be heuristically solved by using Q-learning [16], the
conditions for convergence to a Nash equilibrium are often
very strict and in many cases impractical. By introducing
the CES, the number of the possible states of the game is
simplified into the battery size of the CES, and the multi-
player game is converted into a two-player game. Another
benefit of the centralized CES-based architecture is that the
energy can be distributed based on the channel conditions of
the users served by the SBSs so that the total payoff will be
higher than the case where each SBS individually stores and
consumes the energy. For ease of exposition, in this paper,
we consider an ideal energy transfer from the CES to the
SBSs. However, to model a simple energy loss, we can add
a fixed percentage of loss into the energy consumption of the
CES at each time slot.
All the symbols that are used in the system model and
Section III are listed in Table I.
B. Channel and SINR Model
The received SINR at the user served by SBS i in the
downlink at time slot t is defined as follows:
γi(t) =
pi(t)gi,i
Ii(t)
, (3)
where Ii(t) =
M∑
j 6=i
pjgi,j + p0gi,0 is the interference caused
by other BSs. gi,0 is the channel gain between MBS and
the user served by SBS i, gi,i represents the channel gain
between SBS i and the user it serves, and gi,j is the channel
gain between SBS j and the user served by SBS i. Finally,
pi(t) represents the transmit power of SBS i at time t.
The transmit power of MBS p0(t) belongs to a discrete set
{pmin0 , ..., pmax0 } [13]. We ignore the thermal noise assuming
that it is very small compared to the cross-tier interference.
Similarly, the SINR at a macrocell user can be calculated
as follows:
γ0(t) =
p0(t)g0,0
I0(t) +N0
, (4)
where I0(t) =
M∑
i=1
pig0,i is the cross-tier interference from
M SBSs to the macrocell user, g0,0 denotes the channel gain
between the MBS and its user, g0,i represents the channel
gain between SBS i and macrocell user, and N0 is the thermal
noise.
The channel gain gi,j is calculated based on path-loss and
fading gain as follows:
gi,j = |h|2r−αi,j , (5)
where ri,j is the distance from BS j to user served by BS
i, h follows a Rayleigh distribution, and α is the path-loss
exponent. We assume that the M SBSs are randomly located
around the MBS and the users are uniformly distributed
within their coverage radii r. During a transmission interval
(i.e., a time slot), only one user is served by each SBS in the
downlink direction.
TABLE I: List of symbols used for the single-controller stochastic game model
g¯i Average channel gain between BS i and its associated user g¯i,j Average channel gain between BS j and user of BS i
λ0 (λ1) Target SINR for MBS (SBS) E(t) (Discrete) Battery level of CES at time t
∆T Duration of one time slot in seconds Q(t) Number of quanta distributed by the CES at time t
I¯0(t) Average interference at the user served by the MBS at time t I¯i(t) Average interference at the user served by SBS i at time t
S Maximum battery level of the CES P Finite set of transmit power of the MBS
m, n Concatenated mixed-strategy vector for the MBS and the
CES, respectively
m(s), n(s) Probability mass function for actions of the MBS and the
CES, respectively, when E(t) = s
m(s, p) Probability that the MBS chooses power p ∈ P when E(t) = s n(s, i) Probability that the CES sends i quanta when E(t) = s
ϕ(t) Energy harvested at time t pis Probability that the CES starts with battery level s
β Discount factor of the stochastic game U0, U1 Utility function of the MBS and the CES, respectively
R0, R1 Payoff matrix for the MBS and the CES, respectively φ0, φ1 Discounted sum of the value function of the MBS and the
CES, respectively
III. FORMULATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE
SINGLE-CONTROLLER STOCHASTIC GAME
A stochastic game is a multiple stage game where it
can have different states at each stage. Each player chooses
an action from a finite set of possible actions (which can
be different at each stage). The players’ actions and the
current state jointly determine the payoff to each player
and the transition probabilities to the succeeding state. The
total payoff to a player is defined as the discounted sum
of the stage payoffs or the limit inferior of the averages of
the stage payoffs. The transition of the game at each time
instant follows Markovian property, i.e., the current stage only
depends on the previous one.
A. Utility Functions of MBS and SBSs
In our model, the MBS and the SBSs try to maintain the
average SINR of their users to be close to some targets. Note
that a large target SINR means that a high transmit power
will be required for the SBS which could be limited by the
energy arrival rate and the battery size of the CES. Also, a
higher transmit power means a higher level of interference
to other users. Similar to [6] and [19], the utility function of
the MBS at time t is defined as:
U0(p0, Q, t) = −(p0(t)g¯0 − λ0(I¯0(t) +N0))2, (6)
where I¯0(t) =
M∑
i=1
pi(t)g¯0,i is the average interference at the
macrocell user at time t, and λ0 is the target SINR for the
macrocell user. Clearly, this utility function is maximized
when the SINR at the MBS is λ0. If the SINR is larger
than the target SINR, this implies that MBS transmits with a
larger power than necessary and thus wastes energy. On the
other hand, if the SINR is smaller than the target SINR, it
implies that energy is not utilized effectively provided it has
sufficient energy.
Similarly, the utility function of the CES is defined as
follows:
U1(p0, Q, t) = − 1
M
M∑
i=1
(pi(t)g¯i − λ1I¯i(t))2, (7)
where I¯i(t) =
M∑
j 6=i
pj(t)g¯i,j + p0(t)g¯i,0 is the average inter-
ference at the user served by SBS i at time t. The arguments
of both the utility functions demonstrate that the action at
time t for the MBS is its transmission power p0(t) while the
action of the CES is the number of energy packets Q(t) that
is used to transmit data from the SBSs. Later, in Remark 2,
we will show that the interference and the transmit power of
each SBS can be derived from Q and p0. The conflict in the
payoffs of both the players arises from their transmit powers
that directly impact the cross-tier interference.
Note that the proposed single-controller approach can be
extended to consider a variety of utility functions (average
throughput, total network throughput, energy efficiency, etc.)
B. Formulation of the Game Model
Unlike a traditional power control problem, the action
space of the CES changes at each time slot and is limited
by its battery size. Given the distribution of energy arrival
and the discount factor β, the power control problem can be
modeled by a single-controller discounted stochastic game as
follows:
• There are two players: one MBS and one CES.
• The state of the game is the battery level of the CES,
which belongs to {0, ..., S}.
• At time t and state s, the action p0(t) of the MBS is
its transmission power and belongs to the finite set P =
{pmin0 , ..., pmax0 }. On the other hand, the action of the
CES is Q(t), which is the number of energy packets
distributed to M SBSs. Q(t) belongs to the set {0, ..., s}.
• Let m and n denote the concatenated mixed-stationary-
strategy vectors of the MBS and the CES, respec-
tively. The vector m is constructed by concatenat-
ing S + 1 sub-vectors into one big vector as m =
[m(0),m(1), ...,m(S)] , in which each m(s) is a vector
of probability mass function for the actions of the MBS
at state s. For example, if the game is in state s, m(s, p)
gives the probability that the MBS transmits with power
p. Therefore, the full form of m will include the state
s and power p. However, to make the formulas simple,
in the later parts of the paper, we will use m or m(s)
to denote, respectively, the entire vector or a sub-vector
at state s, respectively.
• Similarly, for the CES, n(s, i) gives the probability
that the CES distributes i energy packets. Note that the
available actions of the CES dynamically vary at each
state whereas the available actions for the MBS remain
unchanged at every state.
• Payoffs: At state s, if the MBS transmits with power p0
and the CES distributes Q energy packets, the payoff
function for the MBS is U0(p0, Q) while the payoff
function for the CES is U1(p0, Q). We omit t since t
does not directly appear in U1 and U0.
• Discounted Payoffs: Denoting by β the discount factor
(β < 1), the discounted sum of payoffs of the MBS is
given as:
φ0(s,m,n) = lim
T→∞
T∑
t=1
βtE[U0(m,n, t)], (8)
where E[U0(m,n, t)] is the average utility of macrocell
user at time t if the MBS and the CES are using
strategy m and n, respectively. Similarly, we define
the discounted sum of payoffs φ1 at the CES. In [20,
Chapter 2], it was proven that the limit of φ0 and φ1
always exist when T →∞.
• Objective: To find a pair of strategies (m∗,n∗)
such that φ0 and φ1 become a Nash equilib-
rium, i.e., φ0(s,m∗,n∗) ≥ φ0(s,m∗,n) ∀n ∈
N and φ1(s,m∗,n∗) ≥ φ1(s,m,n∗) ∀m ∈ M,
where M and N are the sets of strategies of MBS and
CES, respectively.
Given the distribution of energy arrival at the CES, the
transition probability of the system from state s to state s′
under action Q (0 ≤ Q ≤ s) of the CES is given as follows:
q(s′|s,Q) =

Pr(ϕ = s′ − (s−Q)), if s′ < S
1−
S−s∑
X=0
Pr(ϕ = X), otherwise.
(9)
Also, we assume that information about the average channel
gains are available to all players. This implies that the single-
controller stochastic game we present here will be a perfect
information non-cooperative game.
The states of the game can be described by a Markov
chain for which the transition probabilities are defined by
(9). Clearly, the CES controls the state of the game while the
MBS has no direct influence. Therefore, the single-controller
stochastic game can be applied to derive the Nash equilibrium
strategies for both the MBS and the CES.
The two main steps to find the Nash equilibrium strategies
are:
• First, we build the payoff matrices for the MBS and the
CES for every state s, where S ≥ s ≥ 0. Denote them
by R0 and R1, respectively.
• Second, using these matrices, we solve a quadratic
programming problem to obtain the Nash equilibrium
strategies for both the MBS and the CES.
C. Calculation of the Payoff Matrices
To build R0 and R1, we calculate U0 and U1 for every
possible pair (p0, Q), where p0 ∈ P and 0 ≤ s ≤ S. In this
regard, we first derive the average channel gain g¯i,j . Second,
from the energy consumed Q and transmission power p0 of
the CES and the MBS, respectively, we decide how the CES
distributes this energy Q among the SBSs. Then, we calculate
the transmit power at each SBS and obtain U0 and U1. The
next two remarks provide us with the methods to calculate
U0 and U1.
Fig. 1: Graphical illustration of the two BSs A, B, and the
user D located within the disk centred at B.
Remark 1. Given two BSs A and B, assume that a user
D, who is associated with B, is uniformly located within
the circle centred at B with radius r (Fig. 1). Assume that
A does not lie on the circumference of the circle centred at
B and α = 4. Denote AB = R and AD = d, then the
expected value of d−4, i.e., E[d−4] is 1(R2−r2)2 . If A ≡ B,
then E[d−4] = 1−r
−2
r2 given that r ≥ BD ≥ 1. For other
values of α, E[r−αij ] can be easily computed numerically using
tools such as MATHEMATICA.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Recalling that gi,j = |h|2r−4ij and that the fading and path-
loss are independent, we have g¯i,j = E[h2]E[r−4ij ], where
E[h2] = λ, if h follows Rayleigh distribution with scale
parameter λ. Next, we need to find how the CES distributes
its energy to each SBS such that U1 is maximized.
Remark 2. (Optimal energy distribution at the CES) If at
time t the CES distributes Q energy packets to M SBSs
and the MBS transmits with power p0, then the transmit
powers (p1, p2, ..., pM ) at the M SBSs are the solutions of
the following optimization problem (t is omitted for brevity):
max
p1,p2,...,pM
− 1
M
M∑
i=1
pig¯i − λ1( M∑
j 6=i
pj g¯ij + p0g¯i,0)
2 ,
s.t.
M∑
i=1
pi =
K
∆T
Q,
Pmax ≥ pi ≥ 0, ∀i = 1, 2, ...,M,
(10)
where Pmax is the maximum transmit power of each
SBS. Since this problem is strictly concave, the solution
(p1, ..., pM ) always exists and is unique for each pair (Q, p0).
Thus, for each pair (Q, p0), where Q ∈ {0, ..., S} and
p0 ∈ {pmin0 , ..., pmax0 }, we have unique values for U0(p0, Q)
and U1(p0, Q).
Based on the remarks above, for each combination of Q
and p0, we can find the unique payoff U0 and U1 of MBS
and CES. Since Q and p0 belongs to discrete sets we can find
the payoff for all of the possible combinations between them.
Thus, we can build the pay-off matrix R0 for the MBS and
R1 for the CES. The matrix R0 has the form of a block-
diagonal matrix diag(R00, ..., R
S
0 ), where each sub-matrix
Rs0 = (U0(p0, j))
P×{0,...,s}, with p0 ∈ P and j ∈ {0, ..., s}
is the matrix of all possible payoffs for the MBS at state s.
Similarly, we can build R1, which is the payoff matrix for
the CES. A detailed explanation on how we use them will be
given in the next subsection.
D. Derivation of the Nash Equilibrium
If we know the strategy m0 of the MBS, the discount factor
β, and the probability pis that the CES starts with s energy
packets in the battery, then the stochastic game is reduced
to a simple MDP problem with only one player, the CES.
For this case, denote the CES’s best response strategy to m0
by n. Then the CES’s value function φ1(s,m0,n), where
s = 0, ..., S, is the solution of the following MDP problem
[20, Chapter 2]:
min
φ1
S∑
s=0
pisφ1(s,m0,n),
s.t. φ1(s,m0,n) ≥ r1(s,m0, j) + β
S∑
s′=0
q(s′|s, j)φ1(s′,m0,n),
∀s, j, 0 ≤ j ≤ s and 0 ≤ s ≤ S,
(11)
with r1(s,m0, j) =
∑
p0∈P U1(p0, j)m0(s, p0) is the aver-
age payoff for the CES at state s when it consumes j quanta
of energy. Using the Dirac function δ, the dual problem can
be expressed as
max
x
S∑
s=0
s∑
j=0
r1(s,m0, j)xs,j ,
s.t.
S∑
s=0
s∑
j=0
[δ(s− s′)− βq(s′|s, j)]xs,j = pis′ , ∀0 ≤ s′ ≤ S,
xs,j ≥ 0 ∀s, j, 0 ≤ j ≤ s and 0 ≤ s ≤ S,
(12)
where δ(s) = 1 if s = 0 and δ(s) = 0, otherwise.
By solving the pair of linear programs above, the proba-
bility that the SBS chooses action j at state s can be found
as n(s, j) = xs,j∑s
j=0 xs,j
. Using some algebraic manipulations,
we can convert the optimization problem in (11) into a matrix
form as:
min
φ1
piTφ1,
s.t. Hφ1 ≥ RT1m0, (P)
and its dual as
max
x
mT0R1x,
s.t. xTH = piT,
x ≥ 0, (D)
where R1 is the payoff matrices of the CES. Combining the
primal and dual linear programs (i.e., (P) and (D) above) and
using the same notations, we have the following theorems.
Theorem 1 (Nash equilibrium strategies [17]). If the state
space and the action space are finite and discrete, and the
transition probabilities are controlled only by player 2 (i.e.,
the CES), then there always exists a Nash equilibrium point
(m,n) for this stochastic game. Moreover, a pair (m,n) is
a Nash equilibrium point of a general-sum single-controller
discounted stochastic game if and only if it is an optimal
solution of a (bilinear) quadratic program given by
max
m,x,φ,ξ
[m(R0 +R1)x− piTφ1 − 1Tξ],
s.t. Hφ1 ≥ RT1m,
xTH = piT,
Rs0x(s) ≤ ξs1, ∀s = 0, ..., S,
m(s)T1 = 1, ∀s = 0, ..., S,
m,x ≥ 0,
(13)
where ξs is the maximum average payoff of the MBS at
state s. The sub-vector strategy n(s) of the CES at state s is
calculated from x as:
n(s) =
x(s)
x(s)T1
. (14)
We can define different utility functions for the MBS and
the SBS and apply the same method to achieve the Nash
equilibrium. As long as the number of states is finite and the
transition probabilities and the payoff matrices are known, a
Nash equilibrium point always exists.
Theorem 2 (Best response strategy for the MBS). Given a
stationary strategy n of the CES, there exists a pure stationary
strategy m as the best response for the MBS. Similarly, for
any stationary strategy m of the MBS, there exists a pure
stationary best response n of the CES.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Because for every mixed strategy of the CES, the MBS
can find a pure stationary strategy as a best response, we only
need to find Nash equilibrium where the strategy of the MBS
is deterministic. From there, this problem can be converted
to a mixed-integer program with m as a vector of 0 and
1. We can use a brute-force search to obtain an equilibrium
point. For each feasible integer value of m we insert it into
(13) to obtain n. If the objective is zero, then (m,n) is the
equilibrium point. This theorem implies that the optimization
problem in (13) can be solved in a finite amount of time.
Notice that since R0 + R1 is not a positive semi-definite
matrix, there can be several solutions for the quadratic pro-
gramming problem in (13), i.e., multiple Nash equilibrium.
Therefore, to make the chosen Nash equilibrium point more
meaningful, we use the following lemma from [17].
Lemma 1. (Necessary and sufficient conditions for the Nash
equilibrium) m and n constitute a pair of Nash equilibrium
policies for the MBS and the CES if and only if
m(R0 +R1)x− piTφ1 − 1Tξ = 0. (15)
Since pis is the probability that the CES starts with s
energy level in the battery at starting time, from (11), piTφ1
is the average value function of the CES with respect to the
energy arrival rate and the strategies m,n. We are interested
in the Nash equilibrium that maximizes the average payoff
of the CES (i.e., the SBSs). This bias towards the SBSs
is crucial as the available energy of the CES is limited by
the randomness of the energy arrival process and thus the
SBSs are more likely to suffer when compared to the MBS.
Using the lemma above, we change the problem in (13) to
a quadratic-constrained quadratic programming (QCQP) as
stated below.
Proposition 1. (Nash equilibriums that favor the SBSs) The
Nash equilibrium (m,n) that has the best payoff for the CES
is a solution of the following QCQP problem:
max
m,x,φ,ξ
piTφ1,
s.t. m(R0 +R1)x− piTφ1 − 1Tξ = 0,
all constraints from (13).
(16)
By solving this QCQP (i.e., by using a brute-force search),
we obtain a Nash equilibrium that returns the best average
payoff for the CES. Again, we can still have multiple Nash
equilibrium in this case, but all of them must return the same
payoff for the CES. Because there may be multiple solutions,
the CES and the MBS need to exchange information so that
they agree on the same Nash equilibrium.
Algorithm 1 Nash equilibrium for the stochastic game
1: The MBS and the CES build their reward matrices R0
and R1. For each possible pair of energy level and
transmit power (Q, p0), the CES solves (2) to obtain a
unique tuple (p1, p2, ..., pM ) and record these results.
2: The MBS and the CES calculate their strategy m and n,
respectively, by solving (16).
3: At time t, the CES sends its current battery level s to the
MBS. It also randomly chooses an action Q using the
probability vector n(s).
4: The MBS then randomly picks power p0 using distribu-
tion m(s) and sends it back to the CES. Based on p0
and Q, the CES searches its records and retrieves the
corresponding tuple (p1, ..., pM ).
5: The CES distributes energy (p1∆T, p2∆T, ..., pM∆T ),
respectively, to the M SBSs.
From Theorem 2, we know that there exists an equilibrium
with pure stationary strategies for both the MBS and CES.
Recall that with pure strategy, the action of each player is a
function of the state. Thus, if we can obtain this equilibrium,
the CES can predict which transmit power p0 the MBS
will use based on the current state, without exchanging
information with the MBS and vice versa.
E. Implementation of the Discrete Stochastic Game
For the discrete stochastic control game with the CES,
each SBS first needs to send its location and average fading
channel information E[h2] of its user to the CES. Then
the CES and the MBS will exchange information so that
the MBS can have complete knowledge about the average
channel gains at each SBS. Since we only use average value,
the CES and the MBS only need to re-calculate the Nash
equilibrium strategies when either the locations of SBSs
change, e.g., some SBSs go off and some are turned on, or
when the average of channel fading gain h changes, or when
distribution of energy arrival ϕ(t) at the CES changes. Note
that the SBSs and the MBS only need to send the channel
gain information of the corresponding users (to be served) to
the CES.
IV. MEAN FIELD GAME (MFG) FOR LARGE NUMBER OF
SMALL CELLS
The main problem of the two-player single-controller
stochastic game is the “curse of dimensionality”. The time
complexity of Algorithm 1 increases exponentially with the
number of states S or the maximum battery size. Note that
R0 and R1 have dimensions of |P| × S(S + 1)/2, so the
complexity increases proportionally to S. Moreover, unlike
other optimization problems, we are unable to relax the
QCQP in (16), because Theorem 1 states that the Nash
equilibrium must be the global solution of the quadratic
program in (13). To tackle these problems, we extend the
stochastic game model to an MFG model for a very large
number of players.
The main idea of an MFG is the assumption of similarity,
i.e., all players are identical and follow the same strategy.
They can only be differentiated by their “state” vectors. If
the number of players is very large, we can assume that the
effect of a specific player on other players is nearly negligible.
Therefore, in an MFG, a player does not care about others’
states but only act according to a “mean field” m(t, s), which
usually is the probability distribution of state s at time instant
t [21]. In our energy harvesting game, the state is the battery
E and the mean field m(t, E) is the probability distribution
of energy in the area we are considering. When the number
of players M is very large, we can assume that m(t, E) is
a smooth continuous distribution function. We will express
the average interference at an SBS as a function of the mean
field m.
All the symbols used in this section are listed in Table II.
A. Formulation of the MFG
Denote by E(v) the available energy in the battery of an
SBS at time v. Given the transmission strategies of other
SBSs, each SBS will try to maximize its long-term generic
utility function by solving the following optimal control
problem:
min
p
U(0, E(0)) = E
[∫ T
0
(p(v,E(v))g − λ(I(v) +N0))2dv
]
,
(17)
s.t. dE(v) = −p(v,E(v))dv + σdWv, (18)
E(v) ≥ 0, p(v) ≥ 0, (19)
where I(v) is the generic interference at a user served by an
SBS at time v and g is the channel gain between a generic
SBS and its user. The mean field m(v,E) is the probability
distribution of energy E in the area at time v. Using M as the
number of SBSs in a macrocell and assuming that the other
SBSs have the same average channel gain g¯ to the user of the
TABLE II: List of symbols used for the MFG game model
g¯ Average channel gain from a generic SBS to another user p(t, R) Transmit power at a generic SBS as a function of R
E (Continuous) Battery level of an SBS m(t, E) Probability distribution of energy E at time t
R Energy coefficient eR = E m(t, R) Probability distribution of energy coefficient R at time t
Wt Wiener process at time t p¯(t) Average transmit power of a SBS at time t
p(t, E) Transmit power at a generic SBS as a function of E (or R) σ Intensity of energy arrival or loss
current generic SBS, the average interference I(v) at the user
served by a generic SBS can be expressed as I(v) = Mg¯p¯(v),
where p¯(v) =
∫∞
0
p(v,E)m(v,E)dE can be understood as
the average transmit power of “another” generic SBS. Since
the MFG assumes similarity, p¯(v) can be considered as the
average transmit power of a generic SBS at time v. To make
the notation simpler, we denote λ¯ = λg¯M .
Thanks to similarity, all the SBSs have the same set of
equations and constraints, so the optimal control problem
for the M SBSs reduces to finding the optimal policy for
only one generic SBS. Mathematically, if an SBS has infinite
available energy, i.e., E(0) = ∞, it will act as an MBS.
However, for simplicity, we will assume that only the SBSs
are involved in the game and the interference from the MBS is
constant, which is included in the noise N0 as in [22]. Except
that, the system model and the optimization problem here are
similar to those in the discrete stochastic game model.
Assuming that the SBSs are uniformly distributed within
the macrocell with radius r centred at the MBS, the average
interference from the MBS to a generic user served by an
SBS can be easily derived by using a method similar to that
described in Remark 1. For the MFG model, the energy level
E is a continuous non-negative variable. The equality in (18)
shows the evolution of the battery, where σ is a constant
which is proportional to the maximum energy arrival during
a time interval. Wv is a Wiener process, thus dWv = vdv,
where v is a Gaussian random variable with mean zero and
variance 1. This model of evolution for battery energy was
mentioned in [23]. The inflexibility of the energy arrival is
the main disadvantage of using the MFG model compared
to the discrete stochastic game model. The random arrival of
energy is configured as “noise”, so this can be either positive
or negative. We can consider the negative part as the battery
leakage and internal energy consumption. The final inequal-
ities are the causality constraints: the battery state E(v) and
transmit power must always be non-negative. To guarantee
this positivity we follow [24] and change the energy variable
E(v) to E(v) = eR(v). This conversion is a bijection map
from E(v) to R(v), thus we can write m(v,E) = m(v,R)
and p(v,E) = p(v,R), where ∞ > R > −∞. The new
optimal control problem can be rewritten as
min
p(.)
U(0, R(0)) =
E
[∫ T
0
(p(v,R(v))g − λ¯p¯(v)− λN0)2dv
]
, (20)
s.t. dR(v) = −p(v,R(v))e−R(v)dv + σe−R(v)dWv, (21)
p(v) ≥ 0. (22)
To obtain the power control policy p, first, we derive the
forward-backward differential equations from the above prob-
lem. Then, we apply finite difference method to numerically
solve these equations.
B. Forward-Backward Equations of MFG
Assuming that the optimal control above starts at time t
with T ≥ t ≥ 0, we obtain the Bellman function U(t, R) as
U(t, R(t)) = E
[∫ T
t
(p(v,R(v))g − λ¯p¯(v)− λN0)2dv
]
.
(23)
From this function, at time t, we obtain the following
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) [24] equation:
∂tU + min
p≥0
{(
p(t, R)g − λ¯p¯(t)− λN0
)2 − p(t, R)e−R∂RU(t, R)}
+
σ2
2
e−2R∂2RRU = 0, (24)
where p¯(t) =
∫∞
−∞ e
Rp(t, R)m(t, R)dR is the average
transmit power at a generic SBS. The Hamiltonian
min
p≥0
{(
p(t, R)g − λ¯p¯(t)− λN0
)2 − p(t, R)e−R∂RU(t, R)}
is given by the Bellman’s principle of optimality. By
applying the first order necessary condition, we obtain the
optimal power control as follows:
p∗(t, R) =
[
λ¯p¯(t) + λN0
g
+
e−R∂RU
2g2
]+
. (25)
Remark 3. The Bellman U , if exists, is a non-increasing
function of time and energy. Therefore, we have ∂RU ≤ 0
and ∂tU ≤ 0.
From equation (25), given the current interference λ¯p¯(t)+
λN0 at a user, the corresponding SBS will transmit less power
based on the future prospect e
−R∂RU
2g2 . If the future prospect is
too small, i.e., e
−R∂RU
2g2 < −λp¯(t)+λN0g , it stops transmission
to save energy.
Replacing p∗ back to the HJB equation, we have
∂tU +
σ2
2
e−2R∂2RRU + (λ¯p¯(t) + λN)
2−([
λ¯p¯(t) + λN +
e−R∂RU
2g
]+)2
= 0, (26)
which has a simpler form as follows:
∂tU +
σ2
2
e−2R∂2RRU = (pg)
2 − (λ¯p¯(t) + λN)2. (27)
Also, from (21), at time t, we have the Fokker-Planck
equation [21] as:
∂tm(t, R) = ∂R(pe
−Rm) +
σ2
2
∂RR(me
−2R), (28)
where m(t, R) is the probability density function of R at time
t. Combining all these information, we have the following
proposition.
Proposition 2. The value function and the mean field (U,m)
of the MFG defined in (20) is the solution of the following
partial differential equations:
∂tU +
σ2
2
e−2R∂2RRU = (pg)
2 − (λ¯p¯(t) + λN0)2, (29)
p(t, R) =
[
λ¯p¯(t) + λN0
g
+
e−R∂RU
2g2
]+
,
(30)
∂tm(t, R) =∂R(pe
−Rm) +
σ2
2
∂2RR(e
−2Rm),
(31)
p¯(t) =
∞∫
−∞
eRp(t, R)m(t, R)dR, (32)
∫ ∞
−∞
m(t, R)dR =1, where m(t, R) ≥ 0. (33)
Lemma 2. The average transmit power p¯(t) of a generic SBS
is a derivative of the average energy available with respect to
time and can be calculated as
p¯(t) = − d
dt
∫ ∞
−∞
e2Rm(t, R)dR. (34)
Proof: See Appendix C.
Since p¯ is always non-negative, the average energy in an
SBS’s battery is a decreasing function of time. That is, the
distribution m should shift toward left when t increases. This
is because, we use the Wiener process in (18). Since dWt has
a normal distribution with mean zero, the energy harvested
will be equal to the energy leakage. Therefore, for the entire
system, the total energy reduces when time increases.
Lemma 3. If (U1,m1) and (U2,m2) are two solutions of
Proposition 2 and m1 = m2, then we have U1 = U2.
Proof: First, from (21) we derive Fokker-Planck equa-
tion:
∂tm1(t, R) = ∂R(p1e
−Rm1) +
σ2
2
∂2RR(e
−2Rm1),
∂tm2(t, R) = ∂R(p2e
−Rm2) +
σ2
2
∂2RR(e
−2Rm2).
Since m1 = m2 = m, we subtract the first equation from the
second one to obtain ∂R((p1 − p2)e−Rm) = 0. This means
(p1−p2)e−Rm is a function of t. Let us denote f(t) = (p1−
p2)e
−Rm, then we have (p1−p2)m = f(t)eR. From Lemma
2, if m1 = m2 then p¯1(t) = p¯2(t). Since p¯(t) =
∫
eRpmdR,
we have ∫ ∞
−∞
eRp1mdR =
∫ ∞
−∞
eRp2mdR
⇒
∫ ∞
−∞
eR(p1 − p2)mdR = 0, ∀t. (35)
Now we substitute (p1 − p2)m = f(t)eR that results in∫∞
−∞ f(t)dR = 0 ∀t. This means f(t) = 0 or p1 = p2.
Note that U is a function of p¯ and p. Since p¯1 = p¯2 and
p1 = p2, it follows that U1 = U2. This lemma confirms that
an SBS will act only against the mean field m. Thus only
m determines the evolution of the system. Two systems with
the same mean field will behave similarly.
C. Solving MFG Using Finite Difference Method (FDM)
To obtain U and m, we use the finite difference method
(FDM) as in [24] and [30]. We discretize time and energy
coefficient R into large intervals as [0, ..., Tmax∆t] and
[−Rmax∆R, ..., Rmax∆R] with ∆t and ∆R as the step
sizes, respectively. Then U,m, p become matrices with size
Tmax × (2Rmax + 1). To keep the notations simple, we
use t and R as the index for time and energy coeffi-
cient in these matrices with t ∈ {0, ..., Tmax} and R ∈
{−Rmax, ..., Rmax}. For example, m(t, R) is the probability
distribution of energy eR∆R at time t∆t. Using the FDM, we
replace ∂RU , ∂tU , and ∂2RRU with the corresponding discrete
formulas as follows [31]:
∂tU(t, R) =
U(t+ 1, R)− U(t, R)
∆t
, (36)
∂RU(t, R) =
U(t, R+ 1)− U(t, R− 1)
2∆R
, (37)
∂2RRU(t, R) =
U(t, R+ 1)− 2U(t, R) + U(t, R− 1)
(∆R)2
.
(38)
By using them in (29) and after some simple algebraic steps,
we have
U(t− 1, R) = U(t, R) + e−2R σ
2∆t
2(∆R)2
A1 −∆tB1, (39)
where
A1 = U(t, R+ 1)− 2U(t, R) + U(t, R− 1),
B1 = (p(t, R)g)
2 − (λ¯p¯(t) + λN)2 .
Similarly, discretizing (32), we have
m(t, R) =
∆t
2∆R
A2 +
σ2∆t
2(∆R)2
B2 +m(t− 1, R), (40)
where
A2 = e
−(R+1)∆Rp(t− 1, R+ 1)m(t− 1, R+ 1)−
e−(R−1)∆Rp(t− 1, R− 1)m(t− 1, R− 1),
B2 = e
−2(R+1)∆Rm(t− 1, R+ 1)−
2e−2R∆Rm(t− 1, R) + e−2(R−1)∆Rm(t− 1, R− 1).
(41)
To obtain U,m, p, and p¯ using Proposition 2, we need to
have some boundary conditions. First, to find m, we assume
that there is no SBS that has the battery level equal to or
larger than eRmax∆R so that m(t, Rmax) = 0, ∀t. This is
true if we assume that e(Rmax−1)∆R is the largest battery size
of an SBS. Also, when R = −Rmax, from the basic property
of probability distribution
Rmax∑
R=−Rmax
m(t, R)∆R = 1
⇒ m(t,−Rmax) = 1
∆R
−
Rmax∑
R=−Rmax+1
m(t, R).
(42)
Next, to find U , again we need to set some boundary
conditions. Notice that U(Tmax, R) = 0 for all R. We further
assume the following:
• Intutitively, if the battery level of a SBS is full, i.e.,
when R = Rmax, this SBS should transmit something,
or equivalently, p(t, Rmax) > 0. That means
p(t, Rmax) =
λ¯p¯(t) + λN
g
+
e−Rmax∆R∂RU(t, Rmax)
2g2
.
(43)
Therefore, if we know U(t, Rmax − 1) and p, we can
calculate U(t, Rmax).
• Similarly, it must be true that when the available energy
is 0, i.e., R = −Rmax, an SBS will stop transmission.
Therefore, we can assume
λ¯p¯(t) + λN
g
+
eRmax∆R∂RU(t,−Rmax)
2g2
= 0. (44)
Again, if we know U(t,−Rmax + 1), we can calculate
U(t,−Rmax).
• During simulations, in some cases when the density
is very high, we obtain very large (unrealistic) values
of transmit power. Therefore, we must put an extra
constraint for the upper limit. In this paper, we use
E(t) > p(t, E(t))∆T , or eR(t)∆R ≥ p(t, R(t))∆T ,
where ∆T is the duration of one time slot. This means,
we have to limit the transmit power during one time step
∆t to be smaller than the maximum power that can be
transmitted during one time interval ∆T .
Based on the above considerations, we develop an iterative
algorithm (Algorithm 2) detailed as follows.
D. Implementation of MFG
For the MFG, we do not need the location information
for each SBS. However, we need information about the
average channel gain g¯, the number of SBSs M in one
macrocell, and the initial distribution m0 of the energy of
the SBSs. Therefore, some central system should measure
these information, solve the differential equations, and then
broadcast the power policy p to all the SBSs. It is more
efficient than broadcasting all the information to all SBSs and
let them solve the differential equations by themselves. Again,
the central system only needs to re-calculate and broadcast
to all SBSs a new power policy if there are changes in g¯ or
M .
V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
A. Single-Controller Stochastic Game
In this section, we quantify the efficacy of the developed
stochastic policy in comparison to the simple Stackelberg
Algorithm 2 Iterative algorithm for FDM
Initialize input
Set up Tmax × (2Rmax + 1) matrices U , m, p, and
T × 1 vector p¯.
Guess arbitrarily initial values for power p, i.e.,
p(t, R) = eR∆R.
Initialize i = 1, U(Tmax, .) = 0, m(0, .) = m0(.),
m(t, Rmax) = 0, and p(t, 0) = 0.
Initialize ∆R and ∆t as the step size of energy and
time with (∆R)2 > ∆t.
Set MAX as the number of iteration.
Solve PDEs with FDM
while i < MAX do:
Solve the Fokker-Planck equation to obtain m
using (40) and (42) with given p, m0.
Update p¯(t) for Tmax ≥ t ≥ 0 using discrete form
of equation (32).
Calculate U for all t < Tmax by using (39), (43)
and (44) with p, p¯.
Calculate new transmission power pnew using (30).
Regressively update p = ap+bpnew with a+b = 1.
for R ∈ {−Rmax, ..., Rmax}
if p(t, R) > e
R∆R
∆T then p(t, R) =
eR∆R
∆T .
end
i← i+ 1.
end
Loop in Tmax time slots
At time slot t, SBS with energy battery eR∆R transmits
with power p(t, R).
game-based power control policy. The stochastic policy is
obtained from the QCQP problem. On the other hand, for
the Stackelberg policy, we follow a hierarchical method. Let
us assume that at time t SBS i has Ei Joules of energy in its
battery. If the MBS transmits with power p0, then each SBS
tries to transmit with a power such that
min
p1,p2,...,pM
M∑
i=1
(pigi − λIi)2
s.t. pi∆T ≤ Ei
where Ii is the interference from both the SBSs and the
MBS. Since this is a convex problem, although it is solved
independently by each SBS, the results are the same. No-
tice that the objective function for each SBS is similar to
the utility function in (7); therefore, it can provide a fair
comparison against our method. The constraint means that
each SBS cannot transmit more than the energy it has in
its battery. Next, knowing that SBS i will solve the above
optimization problem to find its pi, the MBS calculates its
SINR for different values of its transmit power and picks
the optimal p0. Knowing p0, each SBS solves the convex
optimization above to obtain its transmit power p1, ..., pM .
The tuple (p0, p1, ..., pM ) will be a Nash equilibrium because
no one can choose a better option given the others’ actions.
To solve the QCQP in (16), we use the fmincon function
from Matlab. Note that the fmincon function may return a
local optimal instead. Therefore, in order to obtain a good
approximation for the optimal solution, in our simulations,
we use the incremental method as described below.
First, our QCQP problem is stated as follows:
max
m,x,φ,ξ
piTφ,
s.t. m(R0 +R1)x− piTφ− 1Tξ = 0,
f(m,x, φ, ξ) ≤ 0,
(45)
where f() is a group of linear functions of (m,x, φ, ξ).
By solving this using fmincon, we obtain a local optimal
result (m0,x0, φ0, ξ0). Then we solve the updated QCQP
problem as follows:
max
m,x,φ,ξ
piTφ,
s.t. m(R0 +R1)x− piTφ− 1Tξ = 0,
f(m,x, φ, ξ) ≤ 0,
piTφ0 ≤ piTφ+ ,
(46)
where  is a small positive constant. By solving this new
QCQP, we obtain a local optimal solution that satisfies
the constraints of the original QCQP and returns a bet-
ter result. We keep repeating this step as long as fmin-
con is able to return a solution (mN ,xN , φN , ξN ) with
N > 0 that satisfies the constraints. Then we say that
(mN−1,xN−1, φN−1, ξN−1) is the optimal solution (with the
error of ). Note that the optimal solution for this QCQP can
be found by using brute force search through all possible
integer values of m. Therefore, the result can be double
checked when the number of SBSs is small.
In the simulations, the CES has a maximum battery size
of S = 25 and the volume of one energy packet is K =
25×10−4 J. The duration of one time interval is ∆T = 5 ms
and the thermal noise is N0 = 10−8 W. The small cell users
are considered to be in outage if the SINR falls below 0.02.
The MBS has two levels of transmission power [10; 20] watts
and the SINR outage threshold is set to 5. The energy arrival
at each SBS follows a Poisson distribution with unit rate. The
volume of each energy packet arriving at the CES is C times
larger than the energy packet collected by each SBS. Thus,
the amount of energy in each packet at the CES will be CK
µJ. Therefore, the CES should have a more efficient method
to harvest energy than each SBS (in the case of Stackelberg
method). However, as the maximum battery size of the CES
is limited by S, its total available energy is always limited
by the product SCK µJ regardless of M . For both the cases,
each SBS can receive up to 1.5 mJ of energy from either
the CES or the environment. At the beginning, the CES is
assumed to have its battery full.
From Fig. 2, it can be seen that when the number of
SBSs is smaller than some value, the stochastic method gives
better results. This is because, the CES can redistribute the
harvested energy among the SBSs based on their average
channel gains, and also the QCQP in (16) gives a Nash
equilibrium that favors the CES. However, at some point, its
outage probability will be higher than that for the Stackelberg
approach. This is not surprising since the CES can only
store at most S × K × C µJ of energy. Therefore, when
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Fig. 2: Outage probability of a small cell user with
different number of SBSs when S = 25 states, C = 60,
λ1 = 0.1, λ0 = 10.
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Fig. 3: Outage probability of a small cell user with
different target SINR when S = 25 states, C = 60,
M = 60 SBSs, λ0 = 10.
the number of SBSs increases, the average allocated power
per SBS by the CES reduces while the Stackelberg method
allows each SBS to harvest up to 1.5mJ no matter how large
M is. This means that the Stackelberg method can provide a
better performance compared to using the CES when M is
large.
Following Fig. 3, by increasing the threshold SINR target
λ1 while keeping the number of SBSs fixed, we can reduce
the outage probability of a user served by an SBS. This is
understandable since the average SINR will approach the
higher target and thus reduce the outage probability. However,
for the stochastic methods, the outage will start to increase
when the target SINR is larger than some value. To increase
the average SINR, the SBSs need to transmit with higher
power to at least mitigate the cross-tier interference. However,
a higher transmit power means a higher consumption of
harvested energy, which can create shortages later. Also,
higher transmit powers from the SBSs wil make the MBS
to increase its own transmit power and thus create high
cross-interference. When the target SINR is higher than
some value, the stochastic method will behave greedily by
transmitting as much as possible and the outage will begin to
increase. When the target SINR is large enough, the CES
distributes all of the energy it currently has and thus the
outage probability will become flat. A similar observation
can be made for the Stackelberg approach. However, for this
method, the energy cannot be redistributed to the SBSs with
good channel gains to its users and the distribution of energy
arrivals is ignored; therefore, the results are worse than those
for our stochastic method.
Fig. 4 shows the outage probability when increasing the
quanta volume by choosing a higher multiplier C for the CES.
It is easy to see that, with a higher C, i.e., choosing a more
effective method to harvest energy at the CES, we can achieve
a better performance. The Stackelberg method does not use
the CES, so the outage probability remains unchanged. Note
that, since the battery size of each SBS is limited to 1.5
mJ, at some point, a higher C does not improve the outage
probability.
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Fig. 4: Outage probability of a small cell user with
different quanta volume when S = 25 states, M = 60
SBSs, λ1 = 0.1, λ0 = 10.
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Fig. 5: Outage probability of a macrocell user when S =
25 states, M = 60 SBSs, C = 60, λ0 = 10.
Fig. 5 shows the outage probability of the macrocell user
when M = 60 and C = 60. The stochastic method gives
better results in this case since the SBSs are more “rational”
in choosing their transmit powers in long term. Also, unlike
the Stackelberg method, the CES has a fixed-energy battery,
so when M is large, the average amount of energy distributed
to an SBS will be small, which in turn limits the cross-
interference to the macrocell user. With the Stackelberg
method, the SBSs only try to maximize their payoffs in
the current time slot and ignore the distribution of energy;
therefore, it uses a higher transmit power to compete against
the MBS when the target SINR is increased; therefore, it
creates a larger cross-interference and in turn increases the
outage probability of the macrocell user.
In summary, we see that the centralized method using a
CES can provide a better performance in terms of outage
probability for both the MBS and SBSs. The advantages of
using CES are two folds: First, it allows the harvested energy
to be distributed to the SBSs which have good channel gains
for the scheduled users, and second, it considers the prob-
ability distribution of energy arrivals when calculating the
transmit power policy for both the MBS and SBSs. However,
since the CES has a fixed battery size, this centralized model
performs poorer when it needs to support a large number
of SBSs. To improve this inflexibility, we can adjust other
parameters as follows: change the target SINR, increase the
multiplier C, or increase the battery size of each SBS.
B. Mean Field Game
We assume that the transmit power at the MBS is fixed at
10W and it results in a constant noise at the user served by a
generic SBS. The radius of the macrocell is r = 1000 meter,
so we have constant cross-interference N0 = 10−5 W. The
target SINR is λ = 0.002 and assume that g = g¯ = 0.001.
We discretize the energy coefficient R into 80 intervals, i.e.,
Rmax = 40 and Tmax = 1000 intervals. Similar to the
discrete stochastic case, each SBS can hold up to 150 µJ
in the battery, so the maximum transmit power is 30 mW.
We impose the threshold such that an SBS will not transmit
at R = −Rmax = −40 or E = 0.6 µJ. The intensity of
energy loss/energy harvesting, σ is 1.
For M = 400 SBSs/cell, we have g = 0.001 > λ¯ =
λg¯M = 0.0008, so a generic SBS does not need to use a
large amount of power in order to obtain the target SINR.
Notice that p¯ is the average transmit power of a generic
SBS. Therefore, if a generic SBS reduces p¯, the cost term
λ¯p¯ also reduces. Thus the difference between the cost and
the received power pg will be smaller, which is desirable. It
makes sense that a generic SBS will try to reduce its power
as much as possible in this case. The power cannot be zero
though, because N0 > 0. Moreover, from Fig. 8 and Fig. 9,
we see that, at the beginning, the SBS with higher energy (i.e.,
100 µJ) will transmit with a high power and will gradually
reduce to some value. The SBSs with smaller battery will
increase their transmit powers gradually. Since the transmit
power is small, we see that in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7, the energy
distribution shifts to the left slowly.
On the other hand, when M = 500 SBSs/macrocell, we
have g = λ¯ = 0.001. In this case, the effect is more
complicated because reducing the transmit power may not
reduce the gap between the received power pg and the cost
term λ¯p¯+λN . Again, as can be seen from Fig. 11, the SBSs
with larger available energy will transmit with large power
Fig. 6: Energy distribution over time when M = 400
SBSs/macrocell.
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Fig. 7: Energy distribution over time when M = 400
SBSs/macrocell.
first and after sometime when there is less energy available in
the system, all of them start to use less power. Therefore, as
can be seen in Fig. 10, the energy distribution shifts toward
the left with a faster speed than the previous case.
For M = 600 SBSs/macrocell, we have g < λ¯. This means
each SBS needs to transmit with a power larger than the
average p¯ to achieve the target SINR. In Fig. 12, we see that
the behavior of each SBS is the same as in the previous
case. That is, the SBSs with higher energy transmit with
larger power first and then reduce it, while the “poorer” SBSs
increase their transmit power over time.
We compare the MFG model against the stochastic discrete
model for different values of M . For simplicity, we assume
that each SBS has the same link gain to its user as g = 0.001.
Also, we assume that the channel gain from each SBS to
the user of another SBS is g¯ = 0.001. Using Remark 2,
it can easily be proven that in this case, each SBS will
transmit with the same power, i.e., if the CES sends QCK
µJ of energy to M SBSs, then each SBS receives QCK/M
µJ. Then, the interference at each SBS will be calculated
as g(M−1)g¯+N0M∆T/(QCK) with multiplier C = 20 and the
maximum battery size of the CES as S = 101. Because the
MBS is not a player of the game, the simulation step becomes
simpler, and we only need to solve a linear program for the
MDP problem instead of a QCQP. Therefore, we can call it
Fig. 8: Transmit power to serve a generic user using MFG
when M = 400 SBSs/macrocell.
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Fig. 9: Transmit power for different energy levels when
M = 400 SBSs/macrocell.
as MDP method to accurately reflect the difference.
For the discrete stochastic case, we discretize the Gaussian
distribution to model the energy arrivals at the CES. The
battery size of each SBS is still 150 µJ . The average SINR
of a generic small cell user using both the MFG and MDP
models with different density is plotted in Fig. 13. We see
that using the MFG model, the average SINR increases at
the beginning and then it starts falling at some point. This is
because, when the density is low, the interference from the
MBS is noticeable (i.e., 10−5 W in our simulation). From the
previous figures, it can be seen that an SBS will increase its
power when the density is higher. Therefore, after some point
the co-tier interference becomes dominant and the average
SINR will begin to drop. It means at some value of the
density, e.g., M = 400 SBSs/macrocell in Fig. 13, we obtain
the optimal average SINR. We notice that the MFG model
performs better than the MDP model with the CES. This is
due to the limited battery size of CES which makes it difficult
to support a large number of SBSs.
In summary, we have two important remarks for the MFG
model. First, if the density of small cells is high, the SBSs
will transmit with higher power. Second, from Fig. 13, we
see that by choosing a suitable density of the SBSs, we can
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Fig. 10: Energy distribution over time when M = 500
SBSs/macrocell.
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Fig. 11: Transmit power for different energy levels when
M = 500 SBSs/macrocell.
obtain the highest average SINR. From (30), it can be easily
proven that the average SINR at a user served by an SBS will
always be smaller than the target SINR (because ∂RU < 0).
Therefore, the highest average SINR is also the closest to the
target SINR, which is our objective in the first place.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have proposed a discrete single-controller discounted
two-player stochastic game to address the problem of down-
link power control in a two-tier macrocell-small cell network
under co-channel deployment where the SBSs use stochastic
renewable energy source. For the discrete case, the strategies
for both the macrocell and SBSs have been derived by solving
a quadratic optimization problem. The numerical results have
shown that these strategies can perform well in terms of
outage probability experienced by the users. We have also
applied a mean field game model to obtain the optimal power
for the case when the number of SBSs is very large. We have
also discussed the implementation aspects of these models in
a practical network.
In this paper, we have not explicitly considered the corre-
lation in the energy arrival process. However, this correlation
can be modeled by assuming that the energy arrival has
Markovian property. In this case, to calculate the transition
probability, we will need to extend the definition of the state
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Fig. 12: Transmission power over time when M = 600
SBSs/macrocell.
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Fig. 13: Average SINR at a generic SBS.
to a two-element vector, one is the current energy in the
storage and the second is the energy arrival at this time slot.
Moreover, we have not considered the details of cost and
latency analysis related to the information exchange to and
from the CES and also the charge and discharge loss of the
battery storage. These issues can be addressed in future.
APPENDIX A
Denote the distance between the BS B to its user D as
BD = a. If D is uniformly located inside the disk centred at
B, the PDF of BD is fD(BD = a) = 2ar2 . Denote by θ the
value of the angle ∠ABD, θ is uniformly distributed between
(0, 2pi). Using the cosine law d2 = R2 + a2 − 2aR cos(θ),
we obtain
E[d−4] =
∫ 2pi
0
∫ r
0
(R2 + a2 − 2aR cos θ)−2 1
2pi
2a
r2
da dθ.
(A-1)
First, we solve the indefinite integral over θ as
∫
(R2 + a2 −
2aR cos θ)−2dθ = f1(a, θ) + f2(a, θ) + L, where L is a
constant and
f1(a, θ) =
2(R2 + a2)
(R2 − a2)3 arctan
(R+ a) tan θ2
R− a , and
f2(a, θ) =
2aR sin θ(R2 + a2 − 2aR cos θ)
(R2 − a2)2 .
Since sin 0 = sin 2pi = 0, after integrating f2 over [0, 2pi],
we can ignore it. Thus∫ 2pi
0
(R2 + a2 − 2aR cos θ)−2dθ = pi 2(R
2 + a2)
(R2 − a2)3 .
Next, we integrate the above result over a to obtain the
indefinite integral as:
1
r2
∫
a
2(R2 + a2)
(R2 − a2)3 da =
1
r2
a2
(R2 − a2)2 + L. (A-2)
Applying the upper and lower limits of a, we complete the
proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
First, we prove that given n, there exists a pure stationary
strategy m which is the best response of the MBS against n.
Since the action set of the MBS is fixed, at each state s, given
strategy n(s) of the CES, the MBS just needs to choose a
mixed stationary strategy m(s) such that its average payoff
is maximized. At state s, the average utility function of the
MBS is
E[U1] =
∑
ps0∈P
s∑
j=0
−(ps0g¯0 − λ0I¯(ps0, j))2m(s, ps0)n(s, j),
(B-1)
where ps0 and j ∈ {0, ..., s} are the transmit power of the
MBS and the number of energy packets distributed at the CES
at state s, respectively. I¯(ps0, j) is the average interference
from other SBSs to the MBS if the CES distributes j energy
packets and the MBS transmits with power ps0. We have
I¯(ps0, j) =
M∑
i=1
pig¯0,i + N, where (p1, p2, ..., pM ) is the
solution of Remark 2, with Q and p0 replaced by j and
ps0, respectively. Since
∑
ps0∈Pm(s, p
s
0) = 1 and ms is a
non-negative vector, we have
E[U1] ≤ max
ps0∈P
−
s∑
j=0
(ps0g¯0 − λ0I¯(ps0, j))2n(s, j)
 .
(B-2)
Since the set P is fixed and finite, there always exists at
least one value of ps0 that achieves the maximum for the right
hand side. That means when the game in state s, the MBS
can choose this power level with probability of 1. However,
obtaining a closed-form ps0 is difficult because first we need
to find (p1, ..., pM ) in closed-form by solving (10).
Nevertheless, if the average channel gains from each SBS
to the macrocell user (say g¯0,SBS ) are same, we can obtain
ps0 in closed form by defining I¯(p
s
0, j) =
M∑
i=1
pig¯0,SBS+N0 =
g¯0,SBS
∑M
i=1 pi+N0 =
K
∆T jg¯0,SBS+N0. The final equality
is from (2). Replacing this result back into (B-2), we have
E[U1] ≤ max
ps0∈P
−
s∑
j=0
(ps0g¯0 − λ0(
K
∆T
jg¯0,SBS +N0))
2n(s, j).
(B-3)
The right hand side of this inequality is a strictly concave
function (downward parabola) with respect to ps0. Note that∑s
j=0 n(s, j) = 1. The parabola will achieve the maximum
value at its vertex given by
ps∗0 =
λ0
∑s
j=0
(
K
∆T g¯0,SBSj +N0
)
n(s, j)
g¯0
. (B-4)
If ps∗0 is not available in P , since the right hand side of the
inequality above is a parabola w.r.t. ps0, the best response p
s
0
to n(s) is the one nearest to the vertex ps∗0 .
On the other hand, given strategy m of the MBS, the
problem of finding the best response strategy n for the CES
is simplified into a simple MDP in (11). Then, there always
exists a pure stationary strategy n [20, Chapter 2]. This
completes the proof.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Using the stochastic differential equation in (18) at time t,
dE(t) = −p(t, E(t))dt+ σdWt, we obtain the integral form
as follows:
E(t+ t′)− E(t) = −
∫ t+t′
t
p(v,E(v))dv +
∫ t+t′
t
σdWv
= −p(t¯, E(t¯))t′ + σ(Wt+t′ −Wt),
(C-1)
where t¯ ∈ (t, t+ t′). We obtain the second equality using the
mean value theorem for integrals: If G(x) is a continuous
function and f(x) is integrable function that does not change
sign on the interval [a, b], then there exists x ∈ [a, b] such
that
∫ b
a
G(t)f(t)dt = G(x)
∫ b
a
f(t)dt. Since equation (C-1)
is true for all SBSs, taking expectation of this equality above
for all SBSs (or all possible values of E), we have
E[E(t+ t′)]− E[E(t)] = −E[p(t¯, E(t¯))]t′ + σE[Wt+t′ −Wt],
(C-2)
∞∫
0
Em(t+ t′, E)dE −
∞∫
0
Em(t, E)dE = −t′E[p(t¯, E(t¯))],
(C-3)
where m(t, E) is the distribution of E in the system at
time instant t. Using the fact that W is a Wiener process,
Wt+t′ − Wt follows a normal distribution with mean zero
(i.e., E[Wt+t′ −Wt] = 0).
By dividing both sides by t′ and letting t′ to be very small
(or t′ → dt), we have t¯→ t and
d
∞∫
0
Em(t, E)dE
dt
= −
 ∞∫
0
p(t, E)m(t, E)dE
 = −p¯(t).
(C-4)
Using m(t, R) = m(t, E), dE = eRdR, and changing the
variable E to R, we complete the proof.
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